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Improving the Use of Experimental Auctions in
Africa: Theory and Evidence
Ulrich B. Morawetz, Hugo De Groote, and Simon Chege Kimenju
Experimental auctions have not been widely used in Africa. However, auctions are important
tools for evaluating new products and technologies. To increase the quality of these experiments,
we explore an alternative ﬁrst-price bidding mechanism that is more similar to African market
exchanges and we analyze factors likely to affect bidding. Experiments with African consumers
show that the proposed ﬁrst-price mechanism has no advantage over conventional second-price
mechanisms. Results show high and signiﬁcant cash-in-hand, experimenter, and time of day
effects in main rounds, and signiﬁcant ordering effects in test rounds. These effects need to be
carefully considered when applying the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism in Africa.
Key words: Africa, BDM mechanism, experimenter effect, ﬁrst-price auction, income effect, order
effect, time of day effect
Introduction
Aid to developing economies is often offered in the form of new technologies–such as functional
food for better nutrition, treated mosquito nets, or water pumps–that are intended to improve
living conditions for recipients. Unfamiliar technologies may cause intended beneﬁciaries to view
improvements with mistrust or suspicion. Ex ante target beneﬁcial valuations of these technologies
are important for gauging acceptance and guiding research efforts. For example, crop scientists have
developed varieties of maize, sweet potato, and rice fortiﬁed with increased provitamin A content
to combat worldwide vitamin A deﬁciency. Enhanced provitamin A levels in crops result from high
levels of beta carotene, which gives some foods an unfamiliar yellow or orange color. New varieties
of crops with unusual characteristics should be tested for acceptance among target populations to
determine if they will be adopted.
Stated preference methods, such as contingent valuation (Kimenju and De Groote, 2008) or
choice experiments (Naico and Lusk, 2010), are generally used to determine preferences for new
foodproducts.However,unlessitispossibletocombinestatedpreferenceswithrevealedpreferences
(Jayne et al., 1996), the hypothetical nature of these methods is a drawback. To elicit consumer
preferences ex ante while providing actual incentives, researchers in Western countries often use
experimental auctions (Lusk and Shogren, 2007). Applications of experimental auctions in Africa
are relatively new, but growing in number. Most have examined food preferences using choice
experiments, experimental group auctions. or the auction-like Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM)
mechanisms (Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak, 1964). Masters and Sanogo (2002) studied infant
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food in Mali using a choice experiment; Rutsaert et al. studied imported rice and local improved rice
in Senegal using group auctions; and Kiria, Vermeulen, and De Groote studied quality protein maize
in Tanzania using the BDM mechanism. Several other studies analyzed consumer interest in orange
maize biofortiﬁed with provitamin A. For example, De Groote, Kimenju, and Morawetz (2011) used
a BDM mechanism in Kenya, and De Groote et al. used the BDM mechanism, group auctions, and
choice experiments to perform a similar study in Ghana.
These studies of consumer preferences have for the most part simply copied methods used
successfully in the West without exploring the theoretical and practical ramiﬁcations of their
application in the context of rural African consumers. Signiﬁcant differences between Western and
African participants have been documented in other research areas using economic experiments:
students in Niger were less risk averse but had a higher discount rate than students in China, the
United States, and France (Ehmke, Lusk, and Tyner, 2010); farmers in Ethiopia were more risk
averse than students in the Netherlands (Akay et al., forthcoming); and inhabitants from small-scale
societies with a higher degree of market integration were more cooperative in economic experiments
(Henrichetal.,2001).Economicexperimentsindevelopingcountriesareconsideredausefultoolfor
understanding how people react to proposed solutions to environmental and development problems
(EhmkeandShogren,2009).However,theeffectofsituationsspeciﬁctorural,developingnationson
the application of experimental auctions has not yet been studied. Many factors must be considered
when conducting experimental auctions in rural Africa including differences in participants’ market
experience, income, exposure to games and mass communication, experimenter skills, and a lack of
computer resources.
The BDM mechanism is used frequently in auctions in Western countries. In this scenario, a
single participant bids against a random number generator and, when his or her bid is higher than
the random number, he or she buys the good at a price equal to the randomly drawn number; this
type of auction is equivalent to a second-price or Vickrey auction with two participants (Vickrey,
1961).
Our experience with the BDM mechanism and other types of auctions in Africa (speciﬁcally
Kenya, Ghana, and Tanzania) has led to several concerns. One concern is experimenters often ﬁnd it
difﬁculttoexplaindifferencesinpayingarandompriceratherthanabidpricetoauctionparticipants.
African consumers have more experience with ﬁrst-price auctions in which the winner buys a good
at their own (highest) bid price (Cox, Roberson, and Smith, 1982). Therefore, ﬁrst-price auctions
are more intuitive and easier to understand for participants relative to paying a random price that
is used in a BDM mechanism. A second concern is the order of presentation of different products
in the BDM mechanism. Less-skilled auction participants may be inﬂuenced by the order in which
products are offered.
A third concern of using the BDM mechanism in Africa relates to ethical issues. In experimental
studies involving real money, researchers must avoid pressuring poor participants to buy products
with their own money. Thus, researchers commonly pay consumers for their participation and
provide them with enough funds to buy the offered products. Participants are often provided 50% to
100% more than a product’s price to avoid truncation issues. Although these amounts can represent
signiﬁcant sums of money for poor participants, previous studies have not addressed whether
these amounts inﬂuence bidding behavior in Africa. Studies in Western countries have found a
positive effect of these wealth enhancements on willingness to pay (WTP) for various food products
(Rutström, 1998; Loureiro, Umberger, and Hine, 2003; Corrigan and Rousu, 2006). In addition,
positive effects have generally been larger than can be reasonably explained by income effects alone.
A fourth concern is that experimenters may inﬂuence bidding behavior. Rural African consumers
have limited computer experience and access, which often forces researchers to use people to run
experiments. The effect of experimenter behavior in developed countries has been documented
in laboratory experiments (Venkatesan, 1967) as well as in experimental auctions (Hoffman
et al., 1993). In one experiment, the physical attractiveness of a solicitor collecting for a charity
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Table 1. First- and Second-price Sealed-bid Auction Variants
Price winner pays Sealed-bid group auctions Individual auctions
Highest bid First-price auction First-price BDM mechanism
Second highest bid Second-price auction Second-price BDM mechanism
in hypothetical contingent valuation studies in developing countries (Köhlin, 2001; Whittington,
2002). For experimental auctions in rural Africa where experimenters and participants often have
limited experience, the experimenter is even more likely to inﬂuence the bidding process. Finally,
participants’ WTP for food products in rural areas, where many people often do not have enough
food, is also more likely to be inﬂuenced by the time of day. Rutsaert et al. found that Senegalese
rice buyers’ WTP declined by more than 50% if auctions occurred following a lunch meal.
Because of these concerns, we analyze the design aspects of experimental auctions that are
likely to affect bidding by rural African consumers. We test if a new, ﬁrst-price variant of the BDM
mechanism would change bid averages and variances relative to the conventional, second-price
BDM mechanism. We also evaluate product ordering effects and experimenter effects on bids. We
test cash-in-hand effects by varying the levels of cash available to participants. Finally, we analyze
the effect of the time of day the auction was held.
To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study that focuses exclusively on methodological issues of
experimental auctions in Africa and stresses the importance of local circumstances for unbiased
measurements of WTP. It contributes to experimental auction theory by introducing a new auction
variant, which is useful for comparing behavior in ﬁrst- and second-price auctions.
Analytical Framework for Auction Design and WTP Elicitation
In Western countries, economists have validated results from experimental auctions by comparing
outcomes to results obtained from other elicitation mechanisms, predictions from economic theory,
and observed behavior (Lusk and Shogren, 2007). While we assume that the general principles
of experimental auctions are universal, consumers in developing countries might face different
economic conditions and cultural practices that could, in theory, affect the choice of experimental
design and procedures used when conducting these experiments.
Principles and Types of Experimental Auctions
First-price and second-price sealed-bid auctions are conducted with a group of participants who bid
against each other for desired goods. In both scenarios, participants’ bids are collectively revealed,
and the participant with the highest bid wins the auction. In a ﬁrst-price auction, however, the
winner buys the good based on the highest (his or her own) bid; in a second-price auction, the
winner buys the good for the second highest bid. This approach is used to elicit a bidder’s true WTP.
Table 1 illustrates variants of the ﬁrst- and second-price sealed-bid auction. The BDM mechanism
is methodologically equivalent to a second-price auction and is the only common experimental
auction mechanism that can be used with individual participants. Rather than competing against
other bidders, participants’ bids are compared to a random number; if a bid is higher, the participant
buys the good at the random number price. To analyze the effect of the second-price procedure
in individual auction mechanisms, we developed and tested a ﬁrst-price BDM mechanism that
compares to a conventional BDM mechanism as a ﬁrst-price sealed-bid group auction compares
to a second-price sealed-bid group auction.266 August 2011 Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
Optimal Bidding in Experimental Auctions
The most common and best-known auction is the English auction: bidders sequentially offer
ascending bids and the participant who offers the last and, therefore, highest bid wins. The winner
buys the good for the last bid offered. On the other hand, sealed-bid auctions require participants
to submit sealed bids simultaneously or, at least, bids are revealed simultaneously. In a ﬁrst-price
sealed-bid auction, the participant who submits the highest bid wins the auction and buys the good
for an amount equal to his or her bid. English and ﬁrst-price sealed-bid auctions are both common in
Africa. English auctions were introduced by colonial authorities to help market export commodities
such as tea, coffee, and tobacco (Houtkamp and van der Laan, 1993). Tea auctions began in 1956
in Nairobi, Kenya, and moved to Mombassa in 1969, where auctions are still held weekly at the
Mombasa Tea Center. Coffee auctions in Kenya began in 1934; most Kenyan coffee is still sold
at weekly auctions at the Nairobi Coffee Exchange. In addition to export commodities, English
auctions are also popular with the Kenyan public as a way to raise funds for charities through selling
a wide range of items.
First-price sealed-bid auctions were probably brought to Africa by international organizations.
The United Nations, for example, has standard procedures for these auctions in which bids for
sales are invited in sealed envelopes. Generally, the highest bid wins the auction, although some
restrictions apply (United Nations, 2010). In Kenya, ﬁrst-price sealed-bid auctions are common
in government and non-government organizations for procurement and to dispose of obsolete
equipment.
Economists frequently use auctions to determine WTP for goods (v). Experimental auction
participants are usually provided with cash-in-hand, e, such that e>v for all participants. However,
ﬁrst-price sealed-bid auctions are rarely used in economic experiments because rational and risk-
neutral participants will often bid less than their maximum WTP (Cox, Roberson, and Smith, 1982).
Intuitively, the optimal strategy is not to bid one’s maximum WTP as gains occur if a participant
can pay less than the maximum WTP. However, offering lower bids reduces the chances of winning.
Optimal bids also depend on the number of participants and their maximum WTP.
An alternative procedure is a second-price auction in which the optimal bid equals true WTP.
In this type of auction, a participant with the highest bid still wins the auction, but buys the good
at the second highest bid. The optimal strategy in a second-price auction is to bid one’s maximum
WTP independent of risk aversion (Cox, Roberson, and Smith, 1982). Second-price auctions are,
therefore, incentive compatible (Cox, Roberson, and Smith, 1982).
Standard ﬁrst- and second-price auctions are group exercises because they require at least
two bidders. In areas with dispersed populations, group exercises can be difﬁcult and expensive
to organize particularly if stratiﬁed sampling requires gathering participants with predeﬁned
characteristics. To mitigate these difﬁculties, a procedure developed by Becker, DeGroot, and
Marschak (1964) is particularly suitable for studying rural consumers in areas with dispersed
populations. This BDM procedure allows individual participants to bid against a random distribution
rather than real opponents.
The BDM mechanism is technically a variant of the second-price auction; the only difference
is that the rival bid, r, is drawn from a random distribution rather than from other participants. If a
participant’s bid, b, is higher than or equal to the randomly drawn bid, r, then the participant wins the
auction and buys the good at price r. If a participant’s bid is lower than the randomly drawn number,
then the participant cannot buy the good and no exchange takes place. The BDM mechanism, like
the second-price group auction, is incentive compatible.
First-Price BDM Mechanism, a Variant Closer to Market Bargaining
Estimators that substantially reduce estimation variances can be preferable even if they are biased.
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crop acres may be more cost-effective than performing an expensive, but unbiased, land survey
(De Groote and Traoré, 2005). For this experiment we compare a bidding mechanism that may have
a slight bias and lower variance (ﬁrst-price BDM mechanism) with a mechanism that may have a
higher variance but no bias (second-price BDM mechanism).
Bias and variance could potentially differ among countries and cultures. Rural African
participants are generally less-educated than participants in Western countries; they have less access
to mass communication media, less exposure to a wide range of games, and interact with different
market mechanisms. Different cultural contexts might inﬂuence behavior in unfamiliar bidding
situations. Most Africans, however, have experience negotiating prices in market settings where
buyers always pay their highest offer–essentially a ﬁrst-price mechanism–and many are familiar
with English or ﬁrst-price sealed-bid auctions. We hypothesize that a ﬁrst-price mechanism reduces
bid variance.
The conventional BDM mechanism is a second-price mechanism because winning participants
pay the second-highest bid (the random bid). We now consider an alternative BDM mechanism, in
which a winning participant pays his own bid, b, instead of the randomly determined bid, r. This
variant can be called a ﬁrst-price BDM mechanism because it is an individual auction mechanism
where the highest price (rather than the second highest price) is paid. As with the ﬁrst-price sealed-
bid group auction, the ﬁrst-price BDM mechanism is not incentive compatible because participants
have an incentive to bid less than their true WTP. The difference between the optimal bid of the ﬁrst-
and second-price BDM mechanisms depends on maximum WTP for the good, the distribution from
which participants assume a random bid is drawn, risk aversion levels, income, and cash provided
in the experiment.
To date, no studies have compared bidding behavior in ﬁrst-price and second-price BDM
mechanisms, but ﬁve studies have compared bidding behavior between ﬁrst- and second-price group
auctions.Twostudiesfoundthatbidsfromaﬁrst-priceauctionwerehigherthanthosefromasecond-
price auction (Coppinger, Smith, and Titus, 1980; Cox, Roberson, and Smith, 1982). These results
might be explained by the limited options of the experimental design (Kagel, Harstad, and Levin,
1987), by heterogeneous risk aversion among participants (Cox, Roberson, and Smith, 1982), or by
poor incentives for truthful value revelation (Harrison, 1989). Two later studies found bids from a
second-price auction to be higher than those from a ﬁrst-price auction (Kagel, Harstad, and Levin,
1987;KagelandLevin,1993).Thesestudiesallusedhypotheticalproductswithpre-assignedvalues.
The only study comparing ﬁrst- and second-price group auctions in which participants are
allowed to present their bids for an auctioned product without interference from an experimenter
(home-grown values) did not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant difference between ﬁrst- and second-price auctions
(Lusk et al., 2001). This outcome had been predicted for group auctions with many rational,
independent, homogeneous, and risk neutral participants using values drawn from a known uniform
distribution (Vickrey, 1961). In home-grown value auctions, some participants’ maximum WTP
can be far from the market-clearing price. These participants can be difﬁcult to engage in sincere
bidding in group auctions (Shogren et al., 2001), which affects the elicited mean bids and makes
comparison between ﬁrst- and second-price bidding difﬁcult. The individual ﬁrst- and second-price
BDM mechanisms make it easier to engage participants with a WTP substantially lower than the
market-clearingpriceandmight,therefore,createanadvantageforcomparingﬁrst-andsecond-price
bidding. Our experience supports this idea, but we are unaware of any empirical studies comparing
participants’ sincerity during the BDM mechanism versus second-price group auctions.
Even if bids from a ﬁrst-price BDM mechanism exhibit a slight bias, the mechanism might
still be advantageous if its variance is lower than the variance of a second-price BDM mechanism.
Participants in an auction with unfamiliar rules or procedures might potentially continue to act
according to rules with which they are more familiar (Plott and Zeiler, 2005). Hence, even if
participants are told it is in their best interest to bid their maximum WTP, limited understanding
about how the elicitation mechanism works might trigger participants to default to strategies best
suited to more familiar ﬁrst-price auctions. We assume that this hypothesis holds true for some, but268 August 2011 Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
not all, participants. In a conventional second-price BDM mechanism, participants who do not grasp
the concept might continue to act as if they were participating in a ﬁrst-price auction. In a ﬁrst-price
BDM mechanism, however, all participants would bid using the same, more familiar strategy. This
would then lead to a higher variance in the second-price BDM mechanism provided a substantial
difference exists in the ﬁrst- and second-price BDM mechanism bids as well as equal risk aversion,
income and cash-in-hand among participants.
If we assume that v represents maximum WTP for the product among the population and that d is
the difference between WTPfor theﬁrst- andthe second-price BDMmechanism, thenexpected bids
from the ﬁrst-price BDM mechanism are E(v) + E(d). The variance of ﬁrst-price BDM mechanism
is deﬁned as:
(1) Var(b1st)=s:
In the second-price BDM mechanism, w is the share of participants bidding as in a ﬁrst-price
BDM mechanism, so the expected bid of the second-price BDM mechanism is E(v) + wE(d).
Assuming that N participants bid in the second-price BDM mechanism and the variance within
each group is the same, then the total variance is:
(2) Var(b2nd)=s + (1   w)( wE(d))2 + w((1   w)E(d))2:
If at least one participant bids “incorrectly” in the second-price BDM mechanism (w>0), Var(b2nd)
is greater than Var(b1st).
However, this difference is reduced if participants have heterogeneous risk aversion levels,
incomes or cash-in-hand. The variance of the ﬁrst-price BDM mechanism is susceptible to these
characteristics while the variance of the second-price BDM mechanism is not. Without further
assumptions about consumer preferences, it is impossible to tell whether Var(b2nd) is actually larger
than Var(b1st). We address this question empirically after clarifying the role of experimental design
variables.
WTP as a Function of Experimental Design Variables
Order Effects
In the previous section we assumed maximum WTP, v, to be independent of experimental design
variables. That is, v is determined only by consumer characteristics, z, and characteristics of the
good, x; v=v(x;z). This relation has been the subject of all other experimental auction studies in
Africa. We extend this relation and allow for v to depend on experimental design variables as well.
All experimental auctions in Africa to date have used the “within participant” design, in which
each participant bids for all (not just one) of the products included in the study. Order effects occur if
the order of product presentation inﬂuences WTP. Lusk and Shogren (2007) suggest that order effect
are inﬂuenced by learning while bidding and by participant fatigue. If WTP for a good depends on
the order of presentation, WTP becomes v=v(x;z;o), where o represents order as a number between
1 and the total number of possible orders of presentation.
Cash-in-Hand Effects
In the theoretical optimal bidding model, personal income and money provided in the experiment
do not play a role in optimizing the second-price BDM mechanism (Irwin et al., 1998). However,
several authors have shown that maximum WTP depends on income and, thus, on cash-in-hand (e.g.,
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In high-income countries, researchers have found that differences in participation payments
resulted in differences in WTP for chocolates (Rutström, 1998), cookies (Loureiro, Umberger,
and Hine, 2003), and chips and salsa (Corrigan and Rousu, 2006). However, the estimated effects
were too large to be reasonably explained by income effects. In low-income countries, participation
payments can create relatively large changes in income, making an income effect more plausible.
Additionally, experiments often include a test round to familiarize participants with bidding
procedures. If a participant wins and pays for the test round product, his or her cash-in-hand is
reduced.Thispotentialoutcomecanaffectaparticipant’sbidandresultingmeanWTP.Thissituation




In experimental auctions, participants have pre-existing information that comes from past personal
experience represented by participant characteristics, z. Additional information is provided by the
experimenter; this information, although usually standardized, will differ slightly from experimenter
to experimenter, especially if the experimenter must rephrase instructions for participants. These
differences have been called experimenter effects and can originate from both visual and verbal cues
(Venkatesan, 1967). Experimenter effects have been documented in experimental auctions in the
West (Hoffman et al., 1993) and contingent valuation studies in developing countries (Köhlin, 2001;
Whittington, 2002). To analyze the experimenter effect in experimental auctions in Africa, we note
that maximum WTP for a good depends on the experimenter, q, such that v=v(x;z;o;y;e;q).
Time of Day Effects
Experimental auction bids can change throughout a day. For example, bids for vacuum-packaged
beef in the United States were not the same at various times of the day (Hoffman et al., 1993), while
bids for rice in Senegal were found to be higher in the morning (Rutsaert et al.). This phenomenon
may reﬂect differences in participant samples, but could also reﬂect real differences in valuation that
depend on time. Such differences could be related to unfulﬁlled shopping plans, hunger, fatigue, or
schedule. Participants who intend to buy a product or a close substitute, as well as participants who
are hungry, might value a food item more highly (Hoffman et al., 1993; Rutsaert et al.). Higher bids
as a result of hunger are particularly plausible for ready-to-eat food. On the other hand, if the good
auctioned is either non-food or food that cannot be eaten right away, a hungry participant might
prefer to spend the money on a snack from a nearby shop and, therefore, bid lower. The inﬂuence
of time of day on valuation as a result of unfulﬁlled shopping plans or hunger can be noted as
v=v(x;z;o;y;e;q;t), where t represents time of day.
An alternative explanation for the inﬂuence of hunger on bidding is the relationship between the
metabolic state of a participant and decision-making under risk. Hungry participants are less risk
averse (Symmonds et al., 2010), so they likely bid lower in a ﬁrst-price BDM mechanism. Similarly,
risk aversion could also be inﬂuenced by other stress-generating circumstances such as tiredness or
discomfort.
Experimental Design
De Groote, Kimenju, and Morawetz (2011) estimated Kenyan consumers’ WTP for yellow and
fortiﬁed maize meal to better understand acceptance of new, vitamin fortiﬁed, maize varieties
developed by the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT). We use data
from this study to examine differences between ﬁrst-price and second-price BDM mechanisms, as270 August 2011 Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
well as presentation ordering, cash-in-hand, experimenter, and time of day effects. Acceptance of
new yellow maize varieties is of particular concern because white maize is the main food staple in
most of Eastern and Southern Africa, and many consumers associate yellow maize with livestock
feed and imported food aid for the poor. The quality of some of those varieties deteriorate after
long storage and if improperly handled (Muzhingi et al., 2008). Nonetheless, new vitamin fortiﬁed
varieties, although yellow in appearance, are more nutritious than traditional white varieties.
Survey Tools and Sampling Design
We conducted a series of ﬁrst- and second-price BDM mechanism experiments using the “within
participant” design to study Kenyan consumers’ bidding behavior. Participants were assigned in
alternating order to ﬁrst-price and second-price BDM mechanisms; half of the participants were
assigned to each group. We explained the procedure to participants and emphasized that transactions
would be executed if a participant’s bid was higher than the random number. To help participants
understand the procedure, we organized a test round using cupcakes. Each participant was provided
with 25 Kenyan Shillings (KShs) (US$1=KShs75 in 2009) and asked to bid for three types of
cupcakes, one at a time, with information about the ﬂavor of each cupcake provided before bidding.
Participants stated their bids for the ﬁrst type of cupcake and the procedure was repeated for the
other two types. One of the three rounds was randomly assigned to be binding, and the bid for this
round was compared to a number that was randomly drawn from a normal distribution with a mean
of 10 and a standard deviation of 3, N(10, 3). When the bid was higher than the randomly drawn
number, the participant bought the cupcake. For the ﬁrst-price BDM mechanism, the purchase price
was the same as the bid he or she had offered. For the second-price BDM mechanism, the purchase
price was the randomly drawn number. Participants kept the remainder of the money that they did
not spend and time was provided for answering questions.
During the actual auction, participants were provided with KShs105 and then presented with
three types of maize meal: plain white, fortiﬁed white, and plain yellow. Plain white meal is ordinary
meal without added nutrients. Fortiﬁed white meal is an industrial meal nutritionally enhanced with
vitamins A and B, zinc, and iron, and was purchased at a local market. Plain yellow meal is milled
fromyellowmaizeandisnotlocallyavailabletoparticipants.Allthreemealproductswerepresented
as two-kilogram packages in plain brown paper bags.
The three products were presented in random order to participants who were educated about
their characteristics and allowed to inspect the meal. We offered the different meal types in alternate
order to test for order effects. However, fortiﬁed white meal was never offered before plain white;
this allowed us to ﬁrst measure the valuation of plain white maize meal as a benchmark. Participants
were asked to bid for the ﬁrst product, which the experimenter recorded, and the procedure was
repeated for the other two products. To reduce costs and avoid the effects of reduced marginal utility
over the rounds, only one of the rounds, randomly assigned, was binding. The bid from that round
was compared to a number drawn randomly from a normal distribution N(86,25). If the participant’s
bid was higher than the random number, the participant bought the maize meal and paid either
his or her bid (ﬁrst-price BDM mechanism) or the randomly drawn number (second-price BDM
mechanism).
Date, Location and Sampling
The experiments were conducted in Machakos Town in the Eastern Province of Kenya. We
approached 151 consumers from local maize mills, shops, and supermarkets; approximately equal
numbers of participants came from each location. In each selected outlet, we approached every
third consumer and asked them for an interview. When they agreed (almost always), the interview
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and were conducted by six experimenters who were trained to administer the questionnaire and
implement the BDM mechanism. The experimenters were supervised by the authors.
The Empirical Model
Each participant submitted one bid for each type of meal. When more than one observation per
participant is recorded, the individual speciﬁc error needs to be incorporated in the error term of
a regression model. Fixed and random effects estimators are commonly used for such models. For
orthogonal experimental designs like ours, the estimated coefﬁcients for ordinary least square, ﬁxed
effects, and random effects regression models are the same, but standard errors do not represent the
error structure correctly in the ordinary least squares regression (Oaxaca and Dickinson). We prefer
the random effects model because, unlike the ﬁxed effects model, it allows estimation of coefﬁcients
for variables that do not change between rounds.
In experimental auctions, the lowest possible bid is zero although some participants may prefer
to bid a negative value. Thus, bids are censored at zero. Similarly, if participants do not bid more than
the market price for the good, even though they may value it more highly, bids are censored from
above. Estimated parameters will be biased in the random effects model if censored and uncensored
observations are treated identically. The Tobit model (Tobin, 1958) is the standard method for
analyzing censored data and can also be combined with the random effects model.
The observed bid by participant i for maize meal j, bi;j, can be explained by a participant’s WTP
for the meal and by a strategic reduction of the bid (in the case of a ﬁrst-price BDM mechanism).
Participants’ WTP are modeled as a function of maize meal characteristics (plain white, fortiﬁed
white or plain yellow), represented as two dummy variables in vector x x xj, which represents either
plain yellow or fortiﬁed white meal. The experimental design variables are bundled in a vector, k k kj,
which consists of one binary variable for the BDM mechanism (ﬁrst- or second-price), two binary
variables for the order of presentation, one continuous variable for cash-in-hand (in KShs), ﬁve
binary variables for the different experimenters, one continuous variable for the time of day, and one
binary variable for time of day to control for the lunch time effect. The “short” model is speciﬁed
as:
(3) bi;j =a + b b b
0x x xj + g g g0k k ki + mi + ei;j; for all i and j;
where a is a constant, b b b is the vector of the coefﬁcients for the product characteristics, and g g g is the
vector of the coefﬁcients for variables of the experimental design. The overall error is split into the
participant speciﬁc part, mi, which captures those participant characteristics that inﬂuence value, and
the idiosyncratic part, ei;j.
Most applied research emphasizes estimating b b b, which measures differences in WTP for each
product characteristic. Our emphasis is on analyzing the effect of the experimental design included
in the vector of design variables k k kj. In the short model, this effect is assumed to be identical for
all product characteristics. However, if the inﬂuence of experimental design variables differs for
particularproductcharacteristics,theestimatedmodelmustincluderelevantcrossterms.This“long”
model is speciﬁed as:
(4) bi;j =a + b b b
0x x xj + g g g0k k ki + k k k0
iC C Cx x xj + mi + ei;j; for all i and j;
where C C C is a matrix of the coefﬁcients of the cross effects of design variables, k k ki, with product
characteristics, x x xi.
To test the hypothesis that the variance of the ﬁrst-price BDM mechanism is smaller than the
variance of the second-price BDM mechanism, we apply the robust Brown-Forsythe test (Brown
and Forsythe, 1974). The hypothesis is that the ratio of the variance of the bids from the second-
price BDM mechanism to the variance of the bids from the ﬁrst-price BDM mechanism is equal to272 August 2011 Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
Table 2. Participant Characteristics (N=151)
Mean St. Dev.
Age (years) 35:5 12:7
Male (%) 35:1 47:9
Formal education (years) 11:1 3:5
Cattle owned (number) 2:8 5:3
Maize harvest per ha (t) 0:6 0:9
Has eaten yellow meal before (%) 92:7 26:1
Aware of night blindness (%) 86:1 34:7
Aware of vitamins (%) 95:4 21:1
one. Because a higher variance could be caused by nuisance effects of other variables, we apply the
Brown-Forsythe test for the residuals, mi + ei;j, obtained from an OLS regression of equation (4) that
excludes dummy variables for the ﬁrst-price BDM mechanism. The residuals can be interpreted as
bids net of the explanatory variables and are, therefore, expected to contain smaller nuisance effects.
Tests of order effects were conducted for the test round, as well as for the main experiment. The
means of the bids in different rounds were compared using Welch tests; for the main round, the joint
signiﬁcance of order was also tested with a robust F-test of the regression coefﬁcients.
All data analysis was done in R (R Development Core Team, 2011). The random effects model
was estimated with the package “plm” (Croissant and Millo, 2008) and the Tobit model with the
package “censReg” (Henningsen, 2011). The statistical signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcients were tested
with heteroskedasticity consistent t- and F-tests from the packages “lmtest” (Zeileis and Hothorn,
2002) and “sandwich” (Zeileis, 2004, 2006).
Results
Study Area and Participants
The Machakos district in eastern Kenya is located in a transitional zone between the highlands and
the dry mid-altitude zone, an area that experiences low average rainfall with high variability. Poverty
levels are estimated at 60% (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2003). The district capital, Machakos
Town, is connected to Nairobi to its northwest by 60 kilometers of paved road. The exact number
of inhabitants of the town is difﬁcult to estimate, but the 2009 population census indicates that there
are around 100,000 inhabitants in the urban center (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2010).
Machakos Town is an important administrative center and market for agricultural products.
Table 2 presents summary statistics for participants in the ﬁrst- and second-price BDM
mechanisms. Average age was thirty-six and approximately two-thirds were female. The high
proportion of women is a result of the selection procedure: participants were chosen at the
outlets where they shop for maize meal–a chore for which women are predominantly responsible.
Participants had, on average, more than eleven years of formal education. Therefore, most
participants were likely able to understand the BDM mechanism. On average, participants owned
2.8 head of cattle, an important wealth indicator, but this was highly variable. The most striking
observation is the low average maize yield (0.6 metric tons/hectare), a result of the 2008/09 drought.
Most participants were familiar with characteristics of the auctions goods: 93% had previously
consumed yellow maize, 86% were aware of night blindness (which is caused by vitamin A
deﬁciency), and 95% knew of the existence of vitamins.Morawetz, De Groote, and Kimenju Improving Experimental Auctions in Africa 273
Table 3. Participant Bids (All Numbers in KShs)
BDM mechanism variant First-price (N=75) Second-price (N=76) Both (N=151)
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Bids in 1st test round 10:7 3:5 11:3 3:1 11:0 3:3
Bids in 2nd test round 9:0 3:5 9:0 3:0 9:0 3:2
Bids in 3rd test round 7:6 3:1 7:5 3:3 7:6 3:2
Bids plain white 2 kg meal 76:0 15:2 77:2 13:6 76:6 14:4
Bids fortiﬁed white 2 kg meal 90:3 19:6 89:1 18:8 89:7 19:2
Bids plain yellow 2 kg meal 69:3 21:6 67:6 20:3 68:5 20:9
Test Rounds and Unconditional Bids
Table 3 presents the means and standard deviations of participants’ bids in both the ﬁrst-price
and second-price BDM mechanism. No difference was found between the mean bids of the ﬁrst-
and second-price BDM mechanisms in either the test rounds or the main rounds; equality was not
rejected at a 5% signiﬁcance level. However, there was a clear order effect in the test round bids:
average WTP decreased from the ﬁrst type of cupcake offered to the last; these differences were
all statistically signiﬁcant. Conversely, we did not ﬁnd that order of presentation had any inﬂuence
on bid during the main round. Pair-wise Welch tests of equality of the means were not rejected on
a 5% level for all meal types. Statistically signiﬁcant differences were found for the mean bids for
all three maize meal types. Mean bids for plain white meal (KShs76.6) were lower than those for
fortiﬁed white meal (KShs89.7) but higher than those for plain yellow meal (KShs68.5).
Model Estimation
Conditional inﬂuence of the experimental design variables was tested using the regression results for
equations (3) and (4). Table 4 shows the coefﬁcients and robust standard errors for all experimental
design variables and their cross terms estimated in the random effects model. Participants might be
hesitant to offer bids much higher than market price, so we also estimated a Tobit model censored
at the market price. The main ﬁndings remained the same (results are available from the authors on
request). No participants offered zero bids, so there was no censoring at zero.
Bidding Differences in First- and Second-Price BDM Mechanisms
The binary variables for the ﬁrst-price BDM mechanism are not signiﬁcantly different from zero for
the short or long model. Therefore, we cannot reject the hypothesis that bids in a ﬁrst- and second-
price BDM mechanism are equal. The F-test on the common signiﬁcance of all main and cross
effects indicates that the hypothesis of equal bids in the ﬁrst- and second-price BDM mechanism
cannot be rejected (F420;3-statistic of 0.96 and a p-value of 0.41).
Theoretical differences between ﬁrst- and second-price BDM mechanism bids are needed to
calculate type II errors. Theoretical differences can only be assumed because they depend on the
unknown true WTP for the products, the unknown utility function, and the unknown assumptions
of participants about the random distribution. If the theoretical bids from the ﬁrst-price BDM
mechanism were 10% lower than the mean of bids from the second-price BDM mechanism, the
type II error would be 0.006 for the short model. For the long model, the type II error would be 0.09
for the main effect, 0.0004 for the cross effect with fortiﬁed white, and 0.014 for the cross effect with
plain yellow. For the conventional signiﬁcance level of 0.20 for type II errors, we conclude that there
is no difference greater than 10% between bids from the ﬁrst- and second-price BDM mechanism.274 August 2011 Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
Table 4. Results of Random Effects Model Regression
Short model Long model
Coeff. Est. St. Error Coeff. Est. St. Error
Intercept 20:18 29:36 64:84 35:04
fortiﬁed white 13:08 1:20  24:29 30:7
plain yellow  8:13 1:54  104:73 37:84
First-Price BDM mechanism (yes=1) 1:63 2:25  0:80 2:31
x fortiﬁed white 2:70 2:31
x plain yellow 4:59 2:94
Order of presentation: W,Y, WF 1:75 2:39 2:75 2:58
x fortiﬁed white 4:43 2:79
x plain yellow  7:45 3:84
Order of presentation: Y, W, WF 0:51 2:80  0:02 2:79
x fortiﬁed white 4:19 2:91
x plain yellow  2:58 3:46
Cash at Maize BDM Mechanism (KShs) 0:60 0:23 0:22 0:26
x fortiﬁed white 0:32 0:21
x plain yellow 0:84 0:26
Experimenter 2  8:99 3:81  7:32 4:08
x fortiﬁed white 2:78 3:89
x plain yellow  7:79 4:35
Experimenter 3 11:32 3:11 9:91 3:27
x fortiﬁed white 1:42 3:37
x plain yellow 2:80 4:77
Experimenter 4 7:65 3:53 4:89 3:53
x fortiﬁed white 8:74 2:93
x plain yellow  0:48 5:39
Experimenter 5 3:94 3:48 2:01 3:61
x fortiﬁed white 7:33 3:42
x plain yellow  1:54 3:74
Experimenter 6 1:91 2:95 0:26 3:01
x fortiﬁed white  1:19 3:32
x plain yellow 6:14 3:72
Afternoon (yes=1) 14:35 4:93 9:52 5:11
x fortiﬁed white 7:29 6:01
x plain yellow 7:19 6:63
Time of day (hours)  2:29 1:02  1:65 1:02
x fortiﬁed white  0:99 1:1
x plain yellow  0:93 1:24
Share var.: idiosync.; individual 0:55 0:45 0:52 0:48
q; Adj. R2 (within) 0:46 0:36 0:49 0:41
Participants; Observations 453 151 453 151
Notes: *, **, and *** specify signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Experimenter dummies: Experimenter 1 is reference. Auction Order
dummies are “W”=plain white, “WF”=fortiﬁed white, and “Y”=plain yellow. Order “W, WF, Y” is reference.
If there is no difference between the bids in the ﬁrst- and the second-price BDM mechanism,
then the variance in the second-price BDM mechanism is not affected by limited understanding
among some participants. The variance could be larger in the ﬁrst-price auction if the participants
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Table 5. Comparison of Variances From First- and Second-price BDM Mechanism, Using
Robust Brown-Forsythe Test (H0: Ratio of Variance is One)
Ratio of variancesa 95% Conﬁdence Interval F-stat. Degr. of Freed. p-value
Bids 0.9 [0.69; 1.17] 0.38 451 0.54
Residualsb 0.95 [0.73; 1.24] 0.02 451 0.89
Notes: a Ratio of variances is calculated as the second- over the ﬁrst-price BDM mechanism.
b Residuals are from a regression as in equation (4), but without a dummy for the ﬁrst-price BDM mechanism. They can be interpreted as bids
with netted out effect of the other experimental design variables.
ﬁrst- and second-price BDM mechanism using a robust Brown-Forsyth test. The estimated ratio of
the variance of the second-price BDM mechanism to the variance of the ﬁrst-price BDM mechanism
is 0.90. The F-test does not reject the hypothesis that the ratio of the variances is equal to one. For the
residuals, we ﬁnd a ratio of 0.95 and a p-value of 0.89, indicating that the difference in the variances
is even smaller prior to netting out the inﬂuence of the experimental design variables.
The Effect of Product Ordering
For the short model, the dummy variables for order of presentation for each product type were
individually insigniﬁcant at a 5% level. The dummy variables were also jointly insigniﬁcant as
the F441;2-statistic was be 0.30 (p-value of 0.74). For the long model, the F423;6-statistic of joint
signiﬁcance is 2.10 (p-value of 0.06) and, therefore, is not signiﬁcant at a 5% level. The individual
dummy for plain yellow meal presented before fortiﬁed white was signiﬁcant at the 10% level. The
presence of order effects in the test round, but not in the main round, demonstrates the importance
of conducting test rounds to familiarize participants with auction procedures.
Cash-in-hand Effects
All participants were given KShs25 before the test round and KShs105 before the main round. Cash-
in-hand at the beginning of the main round varied among participants because some had spent some
money in the test round. The average expense in the test round was KShs3.6, leaving the average
participant with KShs21.4 (standard deviation 5.5). Low average expenses are explained by the
fact that only a third of participants won the test round and had to pay for their cupcakes. Among
participants who won a test round, the mean expense was KShs11 (8.5% of the total participation
payment).
The coefﬁcient for cash-in hand was positive and signiﬁcant on a 5% level in the short model
(Table 4). In the long model, dummies for cash-in-hand were jointly signiﬁcant, as the F3;420-statistic
was 6.7 (p-value less than 0.01). This result, however, is driven by the signiﬁcant positive effect of
the plain yellow meal. For every extra KShs1 available to participants at the beginning of the main
experiment, the average bid for plain yellow meal increased by KShs0.84 (95% conﬁdence interval
of [0.33; 1.36]) compared to the average bid for plain white meal. This inﬂuence of cash-in-hand
is important for interpreting the large and negative coefﬁcient for plain yellow meal (KShs-104.73).
Participants who spent all of their money in the test round were left with KShs105 for the actual
round. Their cash-in-hand effect was KShs111.35. Participants who spent no money in the test round
were left with KShs130 in the actual round, and the cash-in-hand effect was KShs137.87. In both
cases WTP for yellow maize meal is positive. This result suggests that cash-in-hand can inﬂuence
bidding for some products. In our case, cash-in-hand inﬂuenced bidding on the inferior plain yellow
maize meal. Consequently, unconditional WTP estimates are susceptible to manipulation even in a
“within participant” design.276 August 2011 Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
Experimenter Bias Effect
Regression results show signiﬁcant effects of different experimenters. F-tests for the experimenter
variables reject the hypothesis of equal bids for different experimenters in both models (for the short
model the F444;6-statistic is 5.6 and for the long model the F432;15-statistic is 4.90, with both p-values
smaller than 0.01).
Coefﬁcients in table 4 indicate substantial differences among bids collected by different
experimenters. In both models the differences were largest between Experimenters 2 and 3, with
differences of KShs20.31 (27% of the average bid) for plain white meal for the short model and
KShs17.24 (22% of the average bid) for the long model. The cross effects show that Experimenters
4 and 5 collected signiﬁcantly different bids (at a 5% level) for fortiﬁed white maize compared to
plain white maize meal. For Experimenter 4 this difference was as high as KShs8.74 (11% of the
average bid for plain white meal).
Because experimenters inﬂuence the bidding for different meal types in different ways, mean
comparisons are suspect even for “within participant” designs. The unconditional average estimated
WTP for product characteristics depends on the number of experiments that were executed by
different experimenters.
Time of Day
We used two variables to measure the inﬂuence of time of day. We included a dummy variable for
“afternoon” if the interview started after 1pm and a continuous variable giving the time when the
interviewstarted.Thejointeffectofthesevariableswassigniﬁcantintheshortmodel(F441;2-statistic
was 4.58 with a p-value of 0.01) at a 5% level but not in the large model (F423;6-statistic was 1.62
with a p-value of 0.14).
Conclusions
Researchers in rural Africa often encounter difﬁculties that their counterparts in Western countries
do not. In this paper, we analyze the individual BDM mechanism, which is particularly easy to apply
in these circumstances because of its ﬂexibility.
Our comparison of two variants of the BDM mechanism revealed that differences in mean bids
were no higher than 10%. We can interpret this in one of two ways: either participants bid their
maximum WTP or they bid strategically lower. Which of the two is true does not matter for “within
participant” design, since we did not ﬁnd a difference in how auction type inﬂuences bidding for
different meal types. Our new ﬁrst-price BDM mechanism would be interesting to researchers if it
had a substantially lower variance than the standard second-price BDM mechanism, but we found no
such evidence. Consequently, bidding in our new ﬁrst-price BDM mechanism does not only result
in similar mean estimates, but also similar variances. We recommend using the usual second-price
BDM mechanism as it has the additional advantage of being theoretically incentive compatible.
The circumstances in which experiments in rural Africa are conducted differ greatly from those
in Western countries. Our evidence is mixed as to whether experimental design variables inﬂuence
the bidding process under these circumstances and cause WTP estimates to be suspect. We found
that order of presentation had no signiﬁcant inﬂuence on WTP in the main rounds, but did have an
inﬂuence in the test rounds. Thus, test rounds are crucial when using inexperienced participants in
experimental auctions.
We also found that cash-in-hand increased WTP for plain yellow maize meal, but had no
apparent effect on other products. This could be because consumers perceive plain yellow meal
as an inferior good. The important conclusion is that cash-in-hand can matter and researchers
should perform sensitivity analyses when conducting similar experimental auctions. Alternatively, if
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for the main experiment. This could be achieved by not actually executing purchases in the test
round. Alternatively, cash-in-hand amounts could be adjusted after the test round by compensating
participants for money spent. Finally, care should be given to assure that amounts of cash distributed
for the test round are small relative to cash distributed for the main experiment.
Experimenter effects clearly inﬂuence estimated WTP. In addition to intense training and
translation of the questionnaires into local languages, we suggest that researchers include main and
cross effect variables for experimenters in their regression models to reduce experimenter effects
before making ceteris paribus conclusions.1
We also found evidence that time of day inﬂuenced bidding. Unlike other studies, we do not
have a particular explanation for this effect. We consider it important for researchers to test and
report these effects as a standard practice in the future.
Many issues still remain to be explored for developing best practices for experimental auctions.
Researchers should document as many variables and circumstances as possible to evaluate possible
effects and reﬁne experimental procedures. Among issues yet to be explored are the size of the
auction audience, storage of auctioned goods, or validity tests such as those developed by Corrigan
and Rousu (2008). If researchers carefully record all potentially relevant circumstances, the BDM
mechanism is a suitable and convenient method for ex ante valuations in poor countries.
[Received January 2011; ﬁnal revision received June 2011.]
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